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6 Sterilization and the Capital Inﬂow
Problem in East Asia, 1987–97
Shinji Takagi and Taro Esaka
6.1 Introduction
At the end of the 1980s, a large volume of capital began to ﬂow into the
emerging market economies of East Asia, owing to both external (or
“push”) and internal (or “pull”) factors.1 Among other things, the factors
that were external to the recipient countries included the lower interest
rates, recessions, and regulatory changes favoring international portfolio
diversiﬁcation, all taking place in the industrialized world. The factors that
were internal to the recipients included their sound economic policies
(supported, for instance, by trade and capital market liberalization), ex-
change rate stability and deposit guarantees, and strong economic funda-
mentals. Roughly, the beginning of the surge in capital inﬂows can be iden-
tiﬁed as 1988 for Thailand, 1989 for Malaysia and the Philippines, 1990 for
Indonesia, and 1990–91 for Korea (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1996;
Bartolini and Drazen 1997; Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi 1998; Mon-
tiel 1998; Villanueva and Seng 1999).
East Asia led the developing world in attracting private capital ﬂows in
the late 1980s, and became the most important destination for private capi-
tal ﬂows in the early 1990s, with its share in total global capital ﬂows to
developing countries rising from around 10 percent in the early 1980s to
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over 40 percent in the 1990s. While the largest portion (about one-half) of
capital inﬂows was initially foreign direct investment (FDI), an increasing
amount of inﬂows took the form of short-term borrowing in later years
(Chen and Khan 1997; Alba et al. 1998). In fact, for the period as a whole,
the bulk of the capital inﬂows was in the form of oﬀshore borrowing by
banks and private corporations, except for Malaysia, where FDI inﬂows
remained larger than bank and private sector borrowing (Radelet and
Sachs 1998).
On an individual level, the capital inﬂows were massive indeed. In terms
of GDP, the volume of cumulative capital inﬂows from 1988 to 1995
amounted to 51.5 percent in Thailand, 45.8 percent in Malaysia, 23.1 per-
cent in the Philippines, 9.3 percent in Korea, and 8.3 percent in Indonesia.
Of the two largest recipients, Malaysia received surges of massive capital
inﬂows in 1992 and 1993, amounting to 15.3 and 23.2 percent of GDP, re-
spectively, while Thailand received consistent ﬂows averaging about 10
percent of GDP annually (Villanueva and Seng 1999). At the end of 1996,
the balance of claims held by foreign banks against these countries stood
at $261.2 billion; of this total, $100 billion was accounted for by Korea,
$69.4 billion by Thailand, $58.7 billion by Indonesia, $28.8 billion by Ma-
laysia, and $14.1 billion by the Philippines. Except in Korea, more than a
half of these claims were the obligations of the nonbank private sector
(Radelet and Sachs 1998).
Undoubtedly, capital inﬂows have both beneﬁts and costs. As beneﬁts,
they promote investment and economic growth in the recipient countries,
allow intertemporal smoothing in consumption, and thus raise welfare
across countries. At the same time, as costs, they may lead to a rapid mone-
tary expansion, an excessive rise in domestic demand and inﬂationary
pressures, an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and widening current
account deﬁcits. They may even increase the vulnerability of recipients to
a sudden reversal in capital ﬂows. For these reasons, and perhaps in the
light of the earlier international debt crisis, the surge in capital inﬂows was,
almost from the inception, perceived by the recipient countries as posing
a challenge for domestic macroeconomic management, and soon began
to be referred to as the “capital inﬂow problem” in the literature on open-
economy macroeconomics (Isard 1995; Montiel 1998).
This paper will examine the extent to which a part of this capital inﬂow
problem was policy induced in the East Asian countries of Indonesia, Ko-
rea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand during the decade preced-
ing the outbreak of the currency crisis in July 1997. The motivation for
this investigation comes from the large accumulation of oﬃcial foreign ex-
change reserves in the recipient countries that was associated with the
capital inﬂows. This indicated that the volume of capital inﬂows was in
excess of the current account deﬁcits; during this period, the reserve accu-
mulation in each country amounted to 25–35 percent of the total capital
ﬂows (see section 6.2 for details). The accumulation of reserves might have
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been an oﬀsetting response to the tight stance of monetary policy, which
was supported by various measures to limit the expansionary impact of
reserve inﬂows in the ﬁrst place. The paper will indirectly test whether
such tight monetary policy measures—described broadly in the paper as
“sterilization”—promoted additional capital inﬂows through keeping the
level of interest rates high, by examining the eﬀectiveness of sterilization
in limiting the impact of reserve inﬂows on the growth of monetary aggre-
gates.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents an
overview of the capital inﬂow episode in the context of Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, by emphasizing the relationship
between the capital inﬂows and the growth of monetary aggregates. Sec-
tion 6.3 summarizes the policy responses, collectively called “sterilization,”
taken by the East Asian monetary authorities to limit the expansionary
impact of reserve inﬂows on the growth of monetary aggregates. Section
6.4 tests for the eﬀectiveness of sterilization in limiting the growth of mone-
tary aggregates, by using both time series and structural approaches. Fi-
nally, Section 6.5 presents concluding remarks.
6.2 An Overview of the Capital Inﬂow Episode in East Asia
During the capital inﬂow episode, the volume of capital inﬂows (as mea-
sured by the surplus in the capital and ﬁnancial account) exceeded the
deﬁcit in the current account in all of the countries concerned, hence re-
sulting in increases in the foreign-asset source component of the monetary
base. In Indonesia, for example, there was a capital inﬂow of $4,495 mil-
lion against the current account deﬁcit of $2,988 million in 1990 (the year
in which the surge of inﬂows began), with an increase in the foreign ex-
change reserve of $2,088 million (or about 46 percent of the net capital
inﬂows).3 For the period 1989–96, about 26 percent of the net capital in-
ﬂows were accumulated as foreign exchange reserves in Indonesia.
A similar story can be told for the other countries. In Korea, the propor-
tion of the net capital inﬂows which were accumulated as foreign exchange
reserves was about 32 percent for the period 1992–96. It was particularly
high in 1992 (when there was a net capital inﬂow of $6,994 million against
the current account deﬁcit of $3,944 million) and in 1993 (when there was
a net capital inﬂow of $3,217 million against the current account surplus
of $990 million). In Malaysia, almost 80 percent of the net capital inﬂows
was accumulated as foreign exchange reserves from 1989 (when the surge
2. The exclusive emphasis of this paper is on the domestic monetary system of the recipient
country, as our primary interest lies in the eﬀectiveness of sterilization as a monetary policy
measure. On the other hand, Montiel and Reinhart (1999) directly test the eﬀect of steriliza-
tion on the volume and composition of capital inﬂows.
3. These balance-of-payments ﬁgures do not necessarily add up to zero because of errors
and omissions. The ﬁgures are all from the IMF, International Financial Statistics.
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of inﬂows began) to 1993. However, it lost reserves in 1994 and 1995 before
moderately gaining them again in 1996. About one-third of the net capital
inﬂows were accumulated as foreign exchange reserves in both the Philip-
pines and Thailand during the inﬂow period.
Reﬂecting the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, the foreign
assets (FA) source component of the monetary base rapidly expanded in
these countries.4 At the same time, all the countries saw a rapid growth in
both narrow and broad money (M1 and M2). In Indonesia, for example,
FA rose about 5.0 times from 1989 to 1996, with M1 rising 2.5 times and
M2 4.7 times during the same period; over the entire sample period, how-
ever, there seems to be a closer correspondence between FA and M1 (ﬁg.
6.1). In Korea, FA, M1, and M2 all increased by roughly the same percent-
4. There is not necessarily a perfect correspondence between changes in the value of for-
eign assets held by the monetary authorities and the oﬃcial settlement accounts in the bal-
ance of payments, owing to valuation and other accounting diﬀerences.
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Fig. 6.1 Indonesia: Foreign assets and monetary aggregates, 1987–97 (in billions
of rupiah)
Source: IMF (various months).
age (i.e., 2.6 times, 1.8 times, and 2.1 times, respectively, from 1991 to
1996); one can observe volatile changes in the growth of M1 (ﬁg. 6.2).
In Malaysia, FA rose 3.2 times from 1989 to 1996, with M1 and M2
both rising 3.6 times. Corresponding to the surge of capital inﬂows, there
was a rapid growth in FA from 1992 to early 1994; M1 then contracted
through the ﬁrst part of 1995 (ﬁg. 6.3). In the Philippines, FA rose 5.8
times from 1989 to 1996, with M1 rising 2.9 times and M2 about 4.0 times.
There were volatile ﬂuctuations in the growth of FA; similar but more
subdued ﬂuctuations were observed for the growth of M1, sometimes dis-
playing negative correlations between the two (ﬁg. 6.4). Finally, in Thai-
land, FA rose 5.5 times from 1988 to 1996, with M1 rising 2.9 times and
M2 3.9 times (ﬁg. 6.5).
In each country, there was a sustained growth in FA, which was associ-
ated with the sustained growth in M1 and M2, hence giving rise to the com-
mon view that the surge in FA associated with the capital inﬂows some-
how caused the rapid growth of monetary aggregates during the capital
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Fig. 6.2 Korea: Foreign assets and monetary aggregates, 1987–97 (in billions
of won)
Source: IMF (various months).
inﬂow episode. The validity of this view will be the subject of our investiga-
tion in the sections to follow.
6.3 Policy Responses to the Capital Inﬂows
As stated earlier, it was feared from the very beginning that the capital
inﬂows might lead to a rapid monetary expansion, an excessive rise in
aggregate demand and inﬂationary pressures, an appreciation of the real
exchange rate, and widening current account deﬁcits. For this reason, the
monetary authorities of East Asian countries resorted to various policy
measures to mitigate that possibility, including capital controls, trade liber-
alization, greater exchange rate ﬂexibility, ﬁscal contraction, and a variety
of monetary measures (Montiel 1998; Reinhart and Reinhart 1998; Vil-
lanueva and Seng 1999). The monetary measures, the focus of the present
paper, included the conventional form of sterilized intervention (designed
to oﬀset the eﬀect of reserve inﬂows on the monetary base by open market
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Fig. 6.3 Malaysia: Foreign assets and monetary aggregates, 1987–97 (in millions
of ringgit)
Source: IMF (various months).
sales of domestic securities), increases in reserve requirements (designed
to limit the impact of reserve inﬂows on the growth of monetary aggregates
by reducing the money multiplier), shifting government deposits from
commercial banks to the central bank, an increase in the discount rate or
otherwise a greater limit on the discount window, moral suasion, and credit
controls. Of these and other monetary measures, sterilized intervention
and the tightening of reserve requirements were the most common and
were employed at one time or another by all of the central banks con-
cerned.
By far, the most common and extensive was sterilized intervention, at
least initially. Often lacking the depth of markets in government securities,
the East Asian central banks supplemented operations in government
securities by issuing their own debt instruments (Villanueva and Seng
1999). For example, in 1987, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) began to issue
short-term BOT bonds with maturities of six months to one year. Mone-
tary Stabilization Bonds (MSBs) and Bank Indonesia Certiﬁcates (SBIs)
were the principal tools of open market operations used by the Bank of
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Fig. 6.4 The Philippines: Foreign assets and monetary aggregates, 1987–97 (in
billions of pesos)
Source: IMF (various months).
Korea and Bank Indonesia, respectively.5 The Central Bank of the Philip-
pines had routinely used Central Bank Certiﬁcates of Indebtedness
(CBCIs), at least until 1994, when open market operations in government
securities gained prominence. Even in Malaysia where the market for gov-
ernment securities is fairly well developed by East Asian standards, Bank
Negara issued series of Bank Negara Bills and Malaysian Savings Bonds
during the peak inﬂow period of 1993.6
After the initial period, however, most of the central banks began to
rely much less on conventional sterilized intervention, in part owing to the
quasi-ﬁscal costs of such operations. The quasi-ﬁscal cost arises because,
in sterilized intervention, the central bank typically exchanges high-
yielding domestic assets for low-yielding foreign assets (Calvo 1991; Klet-
zer and Spiegel 1998). In the consolidated government and central bank
5. In Korea, the ﬁrst auction in MSBs was conducted in April 1993, although they had
been issued earlier. In Indonesia, SBIs were ﬁrst issued in 1984.
6. In Malaysia, central bank securities were ﬁrst issued in 1987.
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Fig. 6.5 Thailand: Foreign assets and monetary aggregates, 1987–97 (in billions
of baht)
Source: IMF (various months).
portfolio, the public sector ends up paying more on its liabilities than it
receives on its assets, as more government debt is held outside the central
bank. Villanueva and Seng (1999) identify the period of active sterilized in-
tervention as 1988–95 for Thailand, 1989 and 1992–93 for Korea, 1990–93
and 1996 for Indonesia, 1990–93 for the Philippines, and 1992–93 for Ma-
laysia. Thus, it was only in Thailand that sterilized intervention was used
consistently throughout much of the capital inﬂow episode.
In addition to sterilized intervention, other measures were also used to
control either the monetary base or the growth of monetary aggregates.
Measures to control base money included central bank borrowing from
commercial banks, and the shifting of government deposits from commer-
cial banks to the central bank. The latter tool was frequently used in Ma-
laysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. In Malaysia, the most important funds to
be so shifted were deposits of the Employee Provident Fund (EPF). It is
said that more than US$2.6 billion in EPF funds were shifted from com-
mercial banks to Bank Negara in 1992 (Villanueva and Seng 1999). In the
Philippines, the government borrowed from the private sector to make
deposits at the central bank. Access to the discount window was reduced
in Korea during 1986–88, in Thailand during 1989–90, and in Malaysia
during 1995–96. In Indonesia, moral suasion and various reporting re-
quirements were imposed on commercial banks during 1994–96. Some con-
trol measures acted almost like cross-border capital controls, such as the
ceiling on the external liabilities of domestic banks and the prohibition of
sales of short-term ﬁnancial instruments to foreigners, both imposed by
Malaysia for several months during 1994.
The most common tool for containing the growth of monetary aggre-
gates (while accepting the increase in base money itself) was to eﬀect a
rise in reserve requirements. Malaysia frequently raised reserve require-
ments and expanded the coverage of institutions and deposits subject to
the requirements. Indonesia and Thailand, although initially reluctant to
raise reserve requirements, became more active users of this tool in later
years. Villanueva and Seng (1999) identify the period during which the
reserve requirements were raised as 1989–92, 1994, and 1996 for Malaysia,
1990 for Korea and the Philippines, 1995–96 for Thailand, and 1996 for In-
donesia.
In this paper, as elsewhere in the recent literature on this subject, what
we call sterilization includes not only the conventional form of sterilized
intervention (in which domestic and foreign securities are exchanged in
an open market transaction), which may be termed “sterilization in the
narrower sense,” but also any form of transaction which is designed to
limit the impact of reserve inﬂows on the growth of monetary aggregates,
which may be termed “sterilization in the broader sense.” Whether it is
deﬁned narrowly or broadly, sterilization tends to raise the level of domes-
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tic interest rates, provided that foreign and domestic assets are imperfect
substitutes and sterilization is thus eﬀective.7
In the case of narrowly deﬁned sterilization, domestic interest rates rise
so as to induce the market participants to hold the greater amount of
domestic assets willingly. In the case of broadly deﬁned sterilization, do-
mestic interest rates rise so as to clear the money market, given the re-
stricted money supply. In either case, a rise in foreign assets would be
prevented from increasing the volume of monetary aggregates at least one
to one, and the resulting rise in interest rate diﬀerentials favoring the do-
mestic assets would promote additional capital inﬂows, given ﬂexible but
stable nominal exchange rates (Takagi 1999). Of course, no additional cap-
ital inﬂows would result if the market participants correctly perceived that
the higher interest rates only reﬂected the higher risk premium of domes-
tic assets and the nonzero probability of currency depreciation. However,
it is said that many market participants tried to exploit the interest rate
diﬀerentials that existed between U.S. dollar–denominated and East Asian
currency–denominated assets by taking unhedged short-term positions for
supposed ﬁnancial gains, believing that the markets were imperfect (Fur-
man and Stiglitz 1998, particularly n. 34).
6.4 Estimating the Eﬀectiveness of Sterilization
The foregoing discussion makes it clear that, in testing for the eﬀective-
ness of sterilization, the conventional method of estimating the oﬀset co-
eﬃcient of the capital ﬂow equation along with the monetary policy re-
action function would be inappropriate in the context of the East Asian
experience (for an example of the conventional method applied to devel-
oping countries, see Takagi 1986). In East Asia, various monetary mea-
sures were used at various times in various intensities in order to sterilize
the eﬀect of capital inﬂows on the growth of monetary aggregates. For this
reason, in what follows, we will test for the eﬀectiveness of sterilization by
estimating the extent to which foreign assets (FA) in the monetary base
explains or predicts monetary aggregates, setting aside the question of how
sterilization is actually eﬀected.
We will use quarterly data for the ten-year period from the ﬁrst quarter
of 1987 through the second quarter of 1997, immediately preceding the
outbreak of the Thai crisis in July 1997. Both narrow money (M1) and
broad money (M2) are used as measures of monetary aggregates, and con-
sumer price indexes are used as the price level (P ). For Korea and the
Philippines, real GDP is used for output (Y ), whereas industrial produc-
tion is used for the other three countries. For the interest rate (i), the money
7. It should be noted that, in practice, sterilization was generally supported by tight ﬁscal
policy, which reinforced the upward pressure on the level of interest rates.
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market rate is used (see the appendix for the sources and descriptions of
the data). Table 6.1 summarizes the time series properties of the variables,
where all but the interest rate are expressed in natural logarithm. The table
overwhelmingly suggests that the variables are integrated of order one, that
is, I(1). The only exceptions are nominal and real FA, and Y in Thailand.
Although not formally reported in the table, all the variables are found to
become stationary when they are diﬀerenced once.
6.4.1 Cointegration Tests
Before proceeding further, we test for the presence of cointegration be-
tween money and foreign assets by using Johansen’s (1988) trace tests, with
lag length chosen by Schwarz’ Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). In
a bivariate system (expressed in natural logarithm), we ﬁnd that neither
M1 nor M2 is found to be cointegrated with FA, except for M2 in Indo-
nesia (table 6.2). In a multivariate system (consisting of real M1 or M2,
real FA, i, and Y, where all but i are expressed in natural logarithm), a co-
integrating relationship is found only for M1 in the Philippines. In what
follows, given the overwhelming evidence that all variables are I(1) and the
general absence of cointegration, we will estimate regression equations in
ﬁrst diﬀerence form without an error correction term.
6.4.2 Granger Causality Tests
First, we will test for Granger causality between money and foreign
assets. A stationary time series x (e.g., FA) is said to Granger-cause a
stationary time series z (e.g., M1 or M2), if the hypothesis that the coeﬃ-
cients cj are collectively zero can be rejected at a given level of signiﬁcance.
(1) z a b z c x sw et j t j j t j t= + + + +∑ ∑− − ,
where t is a time subscript, a is a constant,  is a summation from 1 to k
(where lag length [k] is chosen by SBIC), bj’s are the coeﬃcients of the
lagged dependent variables, w is a vector of other variables, including sea-
sonal dummies (and, in a multivariate system, the lagged values of other
variables, such as output and the interest rate), s is a vector of coeﬃcients
associated with w, and e is a random error term. Both causality from FA
to M1 or M2 and causality from M1 or M2 to FA are tested, although
only the ﬁrst type of causality, which is the focus of this paper, is discussed
in the text below.8
In a bivariate system with FA and M1 or M2 (in logarithmic diﬀer-
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8. As we are considering the impact of a change in FA on monetary aggregates (which
must be eﬀected through the banking sector and presumably takes some time), we believe
that the use of quarterly data is appropriate. If the adjustment of monetary aggregates in
response to a change in FA is completed quickly within a quarter, however, Granger causality
is not revealed in quarterly data.
Table 6.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistics, 1987–97
Variables Seasonal Dummies Time Trend
Indonesia
ln M1 0.320 (4) [0.922] 2.904 (4) [0.160]
ln M2 0.920 (3) [0.781] 2.009 (3) [0.596]
ln FA 0.112 (3) [0.948] 2.666 (4) [0.250]
ln (M1/P) 0.741 (2) [0.835] 2.642 (2) [0.260]
ln (M2/P) 1.009 (3) [0.749] 2.090 (3) [0.552]
ln (FA/P) 0.154 (3) [0.943] 2.554 (4) [0.301]
ln Y 0.312 (4) [0.923] 2.544 (4) [0.306]
i 2.603 (2) [0.278] 2.603 (2) [0.278]
Korea
ln M1 1.686 (3) [0.438] 0.171 (4) [0.995]
ln M2 2.240 (4) [0.191] 1.269 (4) [0.895]
ln FA 0.289 (4) [0.926] 3.087 (4) [0.110]
ln (M1/P) 1.367 (4) [0.597] 0.516 (4) [0.982]
ln (M2/P) 0.038 (4) [0.961] 2.725 (4) [0.225]
ln (FA/P) 0.544 (4) [0.883] 2.986 (4) [0.144]
ln Y 0.661 (4) [0.856] 2.697 (3) [0.237]
i 2.079 (2) [0.557] 2.079 (2) [0.557]
Malaysia
ln M1 0.499 (2) [0.984] 2.396 (2) [0.381]
ln M2 1.155 (2) [0.995] 2.992 (2) [0.134]
ln FA 0.957 (3) [0.768] 1.583 (3) [0.798]
ln (M1/P) 0.220 (4) [0.973] 2.376 (2) [0.392]
ln (M2/P) 1.014 (2) [0.994] 2.778 (2) [0.204]
ln (FA/P) 1.043 (3) [0.736] 1.597 (3) [0.793]
ln Y 0.520 (4) [0.985] 2.191 (4) [0.494]
i 1.918 (3) [0.644] 1.918 (3) [0.644]
The Philippines
ln M1 0.070 (4) [0.964] 1.617 (4) [0.785]
ln M2 1.643 (2) [0.460] 2.071 (4) [0.562]
ln FA 0.217 (2) [0.936] 2.280 (2) [0.444]
ln (M1/P) 1.839 (4) [0.998] 0.169 (4) [0.995]
ln (M2/P) 0.842 (2) [0.806] 1.491 (4) [0.831]
ln (FA/P) 0.261 (2) [0.930] 2.679 (2) [0.244]
ln Y 0.651 (4) [0.988] 2.131 (4) [0.528]
i 2.008 (2) [0.596] 2.008 (2) [0.596]
Thailand
ln M1 0.981 (2) [0.760] 2.197 (4) [0.491]
ln M2 2.413 (3) [0.137] 1.708 (4) [0.747]
ln FA 2.917 (3) [0.043]** 0.324 (3) [0.996]
ln (M1/P) 1.112 (2) [0.709] 2.135 (4) [0.526]
ln (M2/P) 2.309 (2) [0.168] 1.071 (4) [0.933]
ln (FA/P) 2.948 (3) [0.039]** 0.441 (3) [0.990]
ln Y 2.056 (4) [0.262] 3.736 (4) [0.022]**
i 2.069 (2) [0.563] 2.069 (2) [0.563]
Notes: The ﬁgures are augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics obtained from running a regression
with a constant term and seasonal dummies (left column) or with a constant term and time
trend (right column); for the interest rate only, neither seasonal dummy nor time trend is
included (hence, the same statistics are reported in both columns). Lag length was chosen
on the basis of Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). Numbers in parentheses
denote lag length; those in brackets are p-values.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 6.2 Tests of Cointegration between Money and Foreign Assets, 1987–97
Null
Cointegrating
Vectors (r) r  0 r  1
Bivariate: M1 and FA (ﬁrst row); M2 and FA (second row)
Indonesia
VAR (1) 11.90 [0.286] 0.337 [0.770] r  0
VAR (1) 22.99 [0.012]** 1.705 [0.603] r  1
Korea
VAR (3) 8.017 [0.622] 2.955 [0.424] r  0
VAR (3) 6.574 [0.735] 1.976 [0.565] r  0
Malaysia
VAR (1) 5.096 [0.826] 0.019 [0.801] r  0
VAR (1) 6.369 [0.749] 1.246 [0.665] r  0
The Philippines
VAR (1) 6.036 [0.771] 0.005 [0.803] r  0
VAR (1) 6.958 [0.707] 0.006 [0.803] r  0
Thailand
VAR (1) 13.59 [0.180] 1.539 [0.626] r  0
VAR (1) 11.12 [0.347] 0.555 [0.747] r  0
Multivariate: real M1, real FA, output and interest rate (ﬁrst row);
real M2, real FA, output and interest rate (second row)
Indonesia
VAR (1) 39.38 [0.284] 19.43 [0.544] r  0
VAR (1) 44.32 [0.119] 25.80 [0.184] r  0
Korea
VAR (1) 36.23 [0.432] 10.25 [0.930] r  0
VAR (1) 41.13 [0.217] 14.29 [0.821] r  0
Malaysia
VAR (1) 38.60 [0.318] 18.52 [0.602] r  0
VAR (1) 39.20 [0.292] 19.82 [0.518] r  0
The Philippines
VAR (1) 55.73 [0.009]*** 19.85 [0.516] r  1
VAR (1) 38.87 [0.400] 18.95 [0.575] r  0
Thailand
VAR (1) 39.87 [0.264] 21.27 [0.424] r  0
VAR (1) 45.10 [0.102] 21.65 [0.399] r  0
Notes: Johansen’s trace tests on a vector autoregression (VAR) system with a constant term
and seasonal dummies. Lag length (in parentheses) is chosen on the basis of Schwarz’s Bayes-
ian information criterion (SBIC). r denotes the number of cointegrating vectors. Numbers in
brackets are p-values.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
ences), FA is found to Granger-cause M only in Malaysia when M1 is
used and in the Philippines when M2 is used, both at the 10 percent level
of signiﬁcance (table 6.3). At the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance, however,
no Granger causality is found from FA to either M1 or M2.9 In a multi-
variate system with real FA, real M1 or M2, Y, and i (in logarithmic dif-
ferences, except for i which is expressed in simple ﬁrst diﬀerence), no Gran-
ger causality is found at the 10 percent level of signiﬁcance or lower (table
6.4). To the extent that the multivariate system can generally be considered
more appropriate,10 we conclude that no Granger causality was found from
foreign assets to monetary aggregates during 1987–97 in any of the coun-
tries.11
9. We have also followed the procedure of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) to apply Granger
causality tests in the levels of integrated or cointegrated variables. In a bivariate system, the
only evidence of causality from FA to money is found in the case of Malaysia (at the 5
percent level of signiﬁcance) when M1 is used.
10. If the true model includes more variables, the bivariate system of foreign assets and
money may show a spurious relationship.
11. As an additional test, we have also applied Granger causality tests in Johansen’s error
correction model (ECM) framework, given the possible presence of cointegration between
FA and M2 in Indonesia and between real M1, real FA, Y, and i in the Philippines (see table
Table 6.3 Granger Tests of Causality between Money and Foreign Assets,
1987–97 (bivariate VAR)
FA causes M M causes FA
M1 and FA (ﬁrst row); M2 and FA (second row)
Indonesia
VAR (1) F (1,34) 0.388 [0.537] F (1,34) 0.337 [0.565]
VAR (1) F (1,34) 1.132 [0.295] F (1,34) 0.022 [0.882]
Korea
VAR (1) F (1,34) 1.421 [0.241] F (1,34) 0.474 [0.496]
VAR (1) F (1,34) 1.638 [0.209] F (1,34) 0.231 [0.634]
Malaysia
VAR (1) F (1,34) 4.035 [0.053]* F (1,34) 1.455 [0.236]
VAR (1) F (1,34) 0.000 [0.991] F (1,34) 0.480 [0.493]
The Philippines
VAR (1) F (1,34) 0.324 [0.573] F (1,34) 4.622 [0.039]**
VAR (1) F (1,34) 3.146 [0.085]* F (1,34) 1.349 [0.254]
Thailand
VAR (1) F (1,34) 0.039 [0.845] F (1,34) 0.673 [0.418]
VAR (1) F (1,34) 1.077 [0.307] F (1,34) 4.315 [0.045]**
Notes: F-statistics in a bivariate VAR of money (M1 or M2) and foreign assets (FA) with a
constant term and seasonal dummies. Lag length (in parentheses following VAR) was chosen
on the basis of Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). Numbers in brackets are
p-statistics.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
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Another important channel of inﬂuence concerns how a change in FA
might have aﬀected the level of interest rates. Our earlier discussion sug-
gested that eﬀective sterilization would limit the growth of monetary ag-
gregates and raise the level of interest rates at the same time. So far, the
causality tests (along the lines of equation [1]) have suggested the possibil-
ity that sterilization was eﬀective in limiting the growth of monetary aggre-
gates. How then was the level of interest rates aﬀected by sterilization,
given a change in FA? Table 6.5 reports the results of multivariate causality
tests in logarithmic diﬀerences (except for i, which is expressed in simple
diﬀerences). The tests suggest, rather surprisingly, that no Granger causal-
ity was found from FA to the money market rate during 1987–97 for any
of the countries, except for the Philippines, where causality was found at
the 1 percent signiﬁcance level regardless of whether M1 or M2 was used.
This may mean that sterilization was eﬀective, not necessarily in raising
the level of interest rates, but in keeping it from falling toward the world
interest rates. More will be said on this point in the concluding section.
6.2). On the basis of the procedure of Toda and Phillips (1993), the only evidence of causality
(from FA to M1) was found for the Philippines at the 10 percent level of signiﬁcance. Hence,
our conclusion based on tables 6.3 and 6.4 does not change.
Table 6.4 Granger Tests of Causality between Money and Foreign Assets,
1987–97 (multivariate VAR)
FA causes M M causes FA
M1, Y, i, and FA (ﬁrst row); M2, Y, i, and FA (second row)
Indonesia
VAR (1) F (1,28) 0.000 [0.975] F (1,28) 0.073 [0.788]
VAR (1) F (1,28) 0.002 [0.963] F (1,28) 0.038 [0.845]
Korea
VAR (1) F (1,28) 1.235 [0.275] F (1,28) 0.641 [0.429]
VAR (1) F (1,28) 1.191 [0.256] F (1,28) 0.432 [0.515]
Malaysia
VAR (1) F (1,28) 1.520 [0.227] F (1,28) 1.407 [0.245]
VAR (1) F (1,28) 0.093 [0.762] F (1,28) 0.005 [0.942]
The Philippines
VAR (1) F (1,28) 0.531 [0.472] F (1,28) 6.674 [0.015]**
VAR (1) F (1,28) 2.048 [0.163] F (1,28) 1.242 [0.274]
Thailand
VAR (1) F (1,28) 1.298 [0.264] F (1,28) 2.351 [0.136]
VAR (1) F (1,28) 0.303 [0.586] F (1,28) 0.918 [0.346]
Notes: F-statistics in a multivariate VAR of real money (M1 or M2), real foreign assets (FA),
output, and the interest rate, with a constant term and seasonal dummies. Lag length (in
parentheses following VAR) was chosen on the basis of Schwarz’s Bayesian information cri-
terion (SBIC). Numbers in brackets are p-statistics.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
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6.4.3 Tests of Structural Equations
Second, as an additional test of the eﬀect of foreign assets on the growth
of monetary aggregates, we will estimate the following structural equation.
(2)
M FA
 ln lnt
t
t
t
tP
d h
P
qv u
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ = +
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ + +
−
−
1
1
where  is a ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator, M is either M1 or M2, d is a constant,
h is the coeﬃcient of lagged foreign assets, q is a vector of coeﬃcients, v is
a vector of other explanatory variables, including seasonal dummies,
 ln Y, and  i, and u is a random error term.
Equation (2) includes lagged FA, and not current FA, because a change
in FA is believed to aﬀect M1 or M2 over time through the banking sector.
Use of lagged FA also has an additional advantage in that it alleviates
the potential diﬃculty with M1 or M2 aﬀecting FA contemporaneously.
Moreover, in the light of the earlier causality test that, except for the Phil-
ippines, there was no causality between FA and i in either direction, there
is no need to worry about correlation between lagged FA and i, either
(except for the Philippines, of course). However, equation (2) is estimated
Table 6.5 Granger Tests of Causality between Foreign Assets and the
Interest Rate, 1987–97 (multivariate VAR)
FA causes i i causes FA
M1, Y, i, and FA (ﬁrst row); M2, Y, i, and FA (second row)
Indonesia
VAR (1) F (1,28) 2.251 [0.144] F (1,28) 2.009 [0.167]
VAR (1) F (1,28) 1.791 [0.191] F (1,28) 1.933 [0.175]
Korea
VAR (1) F (1,28) 0.251 [0.619] F (1,28) 0.011 [0.913]
VAR (1) F (1,28) 0.134 [0.716] F (1,28) 0.011 [0.915]
Malaysia
VAR (1) F (1,28) 0.239 [0.628] F (1,28) 0.428 [0.517]
VAR (1) F (1,28) 0.775 [0.386] F (1,28) 0.234 [0.631]
The Philippines
VAR (1) F (1,28) 12.27 [0.002]*** F (1,28) 2.217 [0.145]
VAR (1) F (1,28) 8.765 [0.006]*** F (1,28) 1.569 [0.220]
Thailand
VAR (1) F (1,28) 0.268 [0.608] F (1,28) 2.692 [0.112]
VAR (1) F (1,28) 0.546 [0.465] F (1,28) 0.327 [0.571]
Notes: F-statistics in a multivariate VAR of real money (M1 or M2), real foreign assets (FA),
output, and the interest rate, with a constant term and seasonal dummies. Lag length (in
parentheses following VAR) was chosen on the basis of Schwarz’s Bayesian information cri-
terion (SBIC). Numbers in brackets are p-statistics.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
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both with and without i in order to check robustness. We are particularly
interested in the estimated value of h.
Table 6.6 through table 6.10 (ﬁrst two columns under each heading M1
or M2) report the results of estimating equation (2) by ordinary least
squares (OLS) for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land. The F-statistics are generally signiﬁcant (except for Indonesia and
Malaysia when M2 is used); considering that the regression equation is
estimated in ﬁrst-diﬀerence form, the R2 is remarkably high, especially
when M1 is used. The coeﬃcient of output is positive when it is signiﬁcant,
while the coeﬃcient of the interest rate is negative when it is signiﬁcant.
Many of the coeﬃcients of the seasonal dummies (not formally reported
in the tables) are signiﬁcant.
From these tables, we ﬁnd that regardless of whether M1 or M2 is used
or whether i is included, the coeﬃcient of lagged FA (h) is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. The only exception is found for the Philippines when
M2 is used and i is included. Because of the potential simultaneity prob-
lem, not too much conﬁdence can be placed in the present result at this
time. So far as this result is concerned, however, the coeﬃcient (h) is nega-
tive, suggesting that a rise in foreign assets reduces M2 in the next period.
All in all, the overall weight of the evidence seems to suggest that steriliza-
tion was eﬀective in limiting the growth of monetary aggregates during
1987–97 in all countries, aﬃrming the results of the Granger causality
tests.
Finally, the tables (last two columns under each heading) also report
the results of estimating equation (2) by including a slope dummy for the
coeﬃcient of  ln(FAt1/Pt1), with the dummy indicating the intensity of
sterilization
(3)
M FA
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1
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2
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1
where DUM is the dummy variable which takes the value of unity when
sterilization is considered to be particularly intense, and h1 and h2 (replac-
ing h) are the coeﬃcients of lagged real foreign assets under normal con-
ditions and under intense sterilization, respectively. The annual series of
dummy variables were constructed on the basis of information provided
by Villanueva and Seng (1999) and a similar construction of the steriliza-
tion index presented by Reinhart and Reinhart (1998) and Montiel and
Reinhart (1999). The quarterly series are created by simply assuming that,
during a given calendar year, they take the same value as the annual series.
Here, sterilization was considered to be intense if open market operations
were large in scale and accompanied by increased reserve requirements or
transfers of government deposits from commercial banks to the central
bank (see the annual series in table 6.11).
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We consider equation (3) in order to see whether the relationship be-
tween FA and monetary aggregates was invariant through time. If the
policy of intense sterilization was particularly eﬀective in limiting the im-
pact of an increase in FA on the growth of M1 or M2, we should expect
the value of h2 to be negative, so that the coeﬃcient of (FAt1/Pt1) under
intense sterilization (i.e., h1  h2) is algebraically smaller than that under
normal conditions (h1). Because no sterilization was considered intense in
Korea, the results are reported for the other four countries only. The last
two columns under each heading show that the coeﬃcient h2 is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in any of the countries regardless of whether M1 or M2 is
chosen (conﬁrming the earlier results obtained without the slope dum-
mies), although it is indeed negative in Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand. We can thus reaﬃrm our earlier conclusion that sterilization
was eﬀective in limiting the growth of monetary aggregates during 1987–
97, with the additional insight that the eﬀectiveness of sterilization was
indeed greater (albeit marginally) when it was intense.
6.5 Conclusion
The East Asian countries of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand received large volumes of capital inﬂows from the
end of the 1980s through early 1997. The cumulative inﬂows were massive
indeed, amounting to 50 percent of GDP in Malaysia and Thailand, more
than 20 percent in the Philippines, and about 10 percent in Indonesia and
Korea. Although a large portion of the inﬂows initially took the form of
FDI, they increasingly took the form of oﬀshore borrowing by banks and
Table 6.7 Korea: Money Supply Adjustment, 1987–97
Real Narrow Money (M1) Real Broad Money (M2)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 0.064 0.064 0.053*** 0.054***
(1.203) (1.226) (3.394) (3.459)
Output 0.280 0.278 0.064 0.062
(0.879) (0.897) (0.681) (0.679)
Interest rate 0.0003 0.0003
(0.033) (0.134)
Lagged real foreign assets 0.120 0.120 0.040 0.040
(1.303) (1.322) (1.466) (1.484)
F-statistic 10.97*** 16.13*** 16.13*** 19.93***
R 2 0.666 0.746 0.746 0.746
Durbin-Watson 2.680 2.738 2.738 2.743
Notes: See table 6.6.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
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nonbank private corporations in later years. Because of the potential risks
they entail, these capital inﬂows were, almost from the inception, consid-
ered as posing a serious challenge for macroeconomic management, lead-
ing the profession to coin the expression “the capital inﬂow problem.”
An important aspect of the capital inﬂow episode was that the volume
of inﬂows far exceeded the current account deﬁcits, such that the increases
in foreign exchange reserves amounted to 25–35 percent of the net capital
inﬂows. Needless to say, the accumulation of reserves was the result of
foreign exchange market intervention to maintain the level of nominal ex-
change rates. Short of allowing the exchange rate to appreciate, the East
Asian monetary authorities responded decisively to the massive reserve
inﬂows, ﬁrst by the conventional form of sterilization and then by taking
a wide range of measures to limit the eﬀect of the reserve inﬂows on the
growth of monetary aggregates, the measures which are called “broadly
deﬁned sterilization” in this paper.
We began the paper by noting that, whether narrowly or broadly de-
ﬁned, eﬀective sterilization should not only limit the growth of mone-
tary aggregates in response to an increase in foreign assets, but also raise
the level of domestic interest rates. The resulting tight monetary condition
(often supported by tight ﬁscal policy) and higher domestic interest rates
should then promote additional capital inﬂows. The Granger causality
tests and OLS estimates of structural parameters, however, gave the some-
what perplexing results indicating that, while sterilization was apparently
eﬀective in fully limiting the growth of monetary aggregates arising from
Table 6.11 The “Intense Sterilization” Dummy
The
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
1987 0 0 0 0 0
1988 0 0 0 0 0
1989 0 0 0 0 0
1990 0 0 0 1 1
1991 1 0 1 0 1
1992 1 0 1 0 0
1993 0 0 1 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 1
1996 1 0 1 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
Sources: The authors’ judgment based on Reinhart and Reinhart (1998), Montiel and Rein-
hart (1999), and Villanueva and Seng (1999).
Notes: Sterilization is considered intense (i.e., a value of unity is assigned) if open market
operations were large in scale and accompanied by increased reserve requirements or trans-
fers of government deposits from commercial banks to the central bank. The quarterly series
for a given year are assumed to have the same value as the annual series.
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an increase in foreign assets, it was not causing the level of interest rates
to rise.
At this point, a word of reservation might be expressed about the nature
of the methodologies used. We noted at the outset that, given the variety
of tools used to mitigate the impact of reserve inﬂows on the growth of
monetary aggregates in these countries, the conventional method of esti-
mating the oﬀset coeﬃcient of the capital ﬂow equation along with the
monetary-policy reaction function would be inappropriate as a test of the
eﬀectiveness of sterilization. Instead, what we decided to do was to use a
“black box” way of measuring the eﬀectiveness of sterilization, by essen-
tially estimating the statistical signiﬁcance of FA in the equation describ-
ing the growth of M1 or M2, without explicitly considering how sterili-
zation is actually eﬀected. While we believe that this is an intuitively
appealing procedure, given the ultimate objective of sterilization, we also
recognize that it may be subject to potential problems. For instance, the
lack of statistical signiﬁcance may reﬂect, not the eﬀectiveness of steriliza-
tion, but the much smaller magnitude of FA relative to that of either M1
or M2; the results may also be sensitive to the choice of lag length, particu-
larly when the methodologies are applied in ﬁrst-diﬀerence form. In the
future, it will be useful to check the robustness of our methodologies
against alternative speciﬁcations or alternative sample countries.12
Subject to these and other limitations, our results (suggesting the eﬀec-
tiveness of sterilization, while indicating little evidence of an interest rate
rise) are capable of yielding two possible interpretations. First and most
likely, the lack of evidence linking a rise in foreign assets to a rise in interest
rates may simply suggest that sterilization was eﬀective, not necessarily in
raising the level of interest rates, but in keeping it from falling toward
the lower world-interest rates. To support this claim, the moving average
representations of the estimated vector autoregression (VAR) system (re-
ported earlier) suggest that interest rates do rise in response to an inno-
vation in foreign assets in all countries except Korea (ﬁg. 6.6). It is also
possible that a more systematic relationship between foreign assets and
interest rates might have been evident for a more appropriate interest rate
or interest rate diﬀerential. In Indonesia, for example, it is said that the
interest rate on SBIs rose sharply from 11.6 percent in 1988 to 18.8 percent
in 1990 and 21.5 percent in 1991; Furman and Stiglitz (1998) note that
interest rate diﬀerentials did widen in East Asian countries over the period
of sterilization.13
12. In this context, as a robustness check, the referee has suggested the usefulness of
applying our methodologies to countries under currency boards. Data limitations, however,
have prevented us from pursuing this course.
13. According to Furman and Stiglitz (1998), in Thailand, short-term money market rates
rose 400 basis points above comparable U.S. interest rates in 1996, and similar spreads were
observed for other East Asian countries.
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Second, as another possible interpretation of the seeming lack of evi-
dence on the interest rate channel, it is possible that sterilization was not
so eﬀective in limiting the growth of overall monetary assets, although it
was eﬀective in limiting the growth of M1 or M2 which is under the super-
vised banking sector. Although broadly deﬁned sterilization measures
(such as changes in reserve requirements, credit controls, and moral sua-
sion) may be eﬀective against the supervised banking sector, they may
result in disintermediation in an environment where there is a viable non-
bank ﬁnancial sector. In the case of Korea, for example, Spiegel (1995)
documents that the share of assets controlled by the banking sector de-
clined over the period 1986–93, although no such evidence was found for
the Philippines and Malaysia, where the nonbank ﬁnancial sector is not
well developed. It should be noted that this disintermediation interpreta-
tion is not necessarily incompatible with the story that sterilization kept
the level of interest rates high.
In either case, the policy of sterilization pursued by the monetary au-
thorities of East Asia during the capital inﬂow episode was eﬀective in
fully limiting the growth of M1 or M2, and possibly magniﬁed the risk of
capital inﬂows by keeping the level of interest rates high (hence promoting
additional capital inﬂows), by channelling resources to the relatively unsu-
pervised nonbank ﬁnancial sector, or both. In this context, the work of
Montiel and Reinhart (1999) suggests that the sterilization policy of the
Asian monetary authorities not only magniﬁed the volume of capital in-
ﬂows but also skewed the composition of capital ﬂows towards short-term
maturities. Both through additional capital inﬂows with a short-term bias
and through possible disintermediation, it is likely that the capital inﬂow
problem of East Asia leading up to the crisis of 1997 was made more
serious by the active and persistent policy of sterilization.
Appendix
Sources of Data
Except for industrial production in Indonesia and Thailand (which were
obtained from the Bank of Japan’s economic database), all data were ob-
tained from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Sta-
tistics, as follows. Foreign Assets (FA) were obtained from line 11. Narrow
money (M1) and quasi-money were obtained from lines 34 and 35, respec-
tively; M1 and quasi-money constitute broad money (M2). Interest rates
were obtained from the money market rate (line 60b) for Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailand, and from the Treasury bill rate (line 60c) for the
Philippines.
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Comment Leonard K. Cheng
A factor widely considered critical to the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis in
1997–98 is its enormous short-term foreign debt. This paper examines the
extent to which the “capital inﬂow” problem was induced by the “steriliza-
tion” policy or equivalently tight monetary policy pursued by the East
Asian governments. It goes on to test whether sterilization was eﬀective in
limiting the growth of monetary aggregates during the decade before the
East Asian ﬁnancial crisis. The questions raised in this paper are both
interesting and timely.
An inﬂow of capital (as measured by the foreign asset in the monetary
base, abbreviated as FA) will put downward pressure on the domestic in-
terest rate, other things being equal. The eﬀect of any sterilization policy
is to keep the domestic interest rates in the East Asian economies higher
than otherwise, thus inducing an additional amount of capital inﬂow. I
agree with this logic, but I also think the time dimension should be explic-
itly recognized.
In one example, capital ﬂows in, the interest rate falls in response, steril-
ization policy kicks in, and the aggregate money supply drops, thus push-
ing up the interest rate. In another example, sterilization policy kicks in as
soon as capital ﬂows in, and the movement of the interest rate depends on
the extent of sterilization. The interest rate will fall by an amount that is
smaller than that without sterilization if sterilization serves to oﬀset the
capital inﬂow only partially. In contrast, if sterilization serves to more than
oﬀset the capital inﬂow, then the interest rate will rise. Which of these
examples ﬁts the quarterly data better? Do the responses of the monetary
aggregates and interest rates to an innovation in FA as summarized in
ﬁgure 6.6 of the paper imply that sterilization was more than oﬀsetting the
capital inﬂow? Or were both responses the results of an increase in demand
Leonard K. Cheng is professor of economics at the Hong Kong University of Science
and Technology.
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